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Jeroen W. Pluimers on .NET, C#, Delphi, databases, and personal interests

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Archive for the ‘Phishing’ Category

What’s inside the QR code menu at this cafe? – by peabee

Posted by jpluimers on 2024/09/27

This is why I do not trust ordering via QR-code: you never know how good (or usually bad, often even non-existent) their security is.

[Wayback/Archive] What’s inside the QR code menu at this cafe? – by peabee is a really bad example about Google backed DotPe: they have zero-auth and by now have rated limited API access by IP address.

I went to a cafe near my home. I sat down and scanned the QR code on the table. It took me to a website displaying the cafe’s menu. It asked me for my name and Whatsapp mobile number. I entered the details and placed the order.

In 5 mins my order arrived at the table. There was no OTP verification, and no one came to confirm the order. Is this what the peak ordering experience looks like?

It was a slow workday, and I thought I might as well open this QR code website on my laptop and have a quick look under the hood. Maybe I should’ve just made my own coffee and stayed home because I didn’t realize I was opening a can of worms.

This kind of zero-auth is not infrequent: the Panels API and CDN were wide-open too: [Wayback/Archive] https://storage.googleapis.com/panels-api/data/20240916/media-1a-i-p~s

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Posted in Authentication, Development, Infosec (Information Security), LifeHacker, Phishing, Power User, Security, Software Development | Tagged: | Leave a Comment »

How to encourage phishing: send email to users from a different domain than they are subscribed to

Posted by jpluimers on 2023/06/08

Many organisations train their personell with phishing attempts from domains that are different from the one the organisation uses.

The mantra is: only respond to emails (or clicking links in them) from domains you know.

Microsoft sent (still sends?) account expiration emails for various *.microsoft.com, *.visualstudio.com and other Microsoft domains like this:

[Wayback/Archive] 232840055-2ccfdb9b-2a13-4a34-92f5-f27f337825f8.png (766×653) email from Microsoft account team <account-security-noreply@mail.msa.msidentity.com>

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Posted in Pen Testing, Phishing, Power User, Red team, Security | Leave a Comment »