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Jeroen W. Pluimers on .NET, C#, Delphi, databases, and personal interests

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Archive for the ‘Security’ Category

Some links on Chrome not prompting to save passwords (when Firefox and Safari do)

Posted by jpluimers on 2022/01/20

For quite some time now, Chrome (think years) refuses to prompt for saving passwords whereas Firefox and Safari do prompt and save them, even for site types that it used to save passwords for in the past.

It has been annoying enough for too long now that I tried to do better than the Google searches I used back when I saw this happen first.

Below are some links based on new searches (starting with [Wayback] adding a password in chrome settings – Google Search); hopefully I can try them after I made a list of sites that Chrome does not show the password save prompt for.

Solutions I tried that failed (but maybe useful for others):

Solutions still to try:

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Posted in Chrome, Chrome, Communications Development, Development, Encryption, ESXi6, ESXi6.5, ESXi6.7, Firefox, Fritz!, Fritz!Box, Fritz!WLAN, Google, https, HTTPS/TLS security, Internet, Internet protocol suite, Let's Encrypt (letsencrypt/certbot), Power User, routers, Safari, Security, TCP, TLS, Virtualization, VMware, VMware ESXi, Web Browsers, Web Development | Leave a Comment »

Security questions are evil because of social media “games” phishing for them

Posted by jpluimers on 2022/01/11

Via [] Jilles Groenendijk on Twitter: “what @AppSecBloke said… “, from:

I don’t normally do this but here goes:

First job STOP
Current job SENDING
Dream Job YOUR
Favorite food POTENTIAL
Favorite dog PASSWORDS
Favorite footwear OR
Favorite Chocolate bar MEMORABLE
Favorite Ice Cream DATA
Your Vehicle color TO
Favorite Holiday PEOPLE
Night owl or earlybird WHO
Favorite day of the week COLLECT
Tattoos THIS
Favourite colour INFORMATION
Do you like vegetables FOR
Do you wear glasses SOCIAL
Favourite season ENGINEERING

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Posted in Facebook, Instagram, LifeHacker, Pen Testing, Power User, Security, SocialMedia | Leave a Comment »

SVB PGB and DigiD security suddenly logged you out every 15 minutes despite the count down counter indicating otherwise.

Posted by jpluimers on 2021/12/14

From a while back, so I hope it has been fixed by now on the SVB PGB site.

The Dutch SVB (sociale verzekeringsbank, the [WayBack] organisation that implements social security schemes in The Netherlands) has a web-site to submit declarations for PGB ([Wayback] individualised subsidy for care, or personal care budget).

Authentication for the site goes through DigiD, the identity provider through which government related web-sites can verify the identity of Dutch residents on the internet.

In from somewhere in the mid 2010s until somewhere in 2020, the SVB PGB site would log you out when the 15-minute inactivity count-down in the lower right of the screen would reach zero.

After that, the behaviour changed: you would be logged out 15 minutes after logon, forcing one to login way more often. Each logoff/logon cycle had these effets:

  1. loosing the data you entered on the current page
  2. a cost to SVB of about EUR 0.15 excluding VAT for the logon
  3. loss of time and convenience for the end-user

Note that due to site stability reasons in the years before, I already printed each web-page to PDF before submitting, as there was no way to use the “back” button to see what information you had entered.

That way at least I had the information at hand when re-entering the same information. It also provided me of a “paper” trail of site navigation and entered data.

That’s why I reported it early March 2021:

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Posted in Authentication, Development, DigiD, Power User, Security, Software Development, Web Development | Leave a Comment »

Jan Schaumann: “The secret language of coders, part N of many. Today: “risk acceptance”… “

Posted by jpluimers on 2021/12/08

From a while back, but more relevant than ever:

[] Jan Schaumann on Twitter: “The secret language of coders, part N of many. Today: “risk acceptance”… “

Obligatory video below the fold.


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Posted in Development, DevOps, Infrastructure, LifeHacker, Power User, Security, Software Development | Leave a Comment »

OWASP top rated security “feature” A01:2021 – Broken Access Control

Posted by jpluimers on 2021/11/24

An important [Wayback/Archive] A01:2021 – Broken Access Control, in German, is a pre-amble for a future post about getting a feel how to counter the vulnerabilities that OWASP tracks and documents.

Basically remember that Broken Access Control is by far the most vulnerable feature in applications:

Broken Access Control war 2017 auf Platz 5 und ist jetzt Problem #1. 94 % der getesteten Anwendungen hatten irgendeine Form von defekter Zugangskontrolle. Der ehemalige #1 Dauerbrenner Injection ist nur noch auf Platz 3.

Basically the top 3 changed dramatically between 2017 and 2021. The new top-3 is below. Please get acquainted with it.

  1. [Wayback/Archive] A01 Broken Access Control – OWASP Top 10:2021

    Moving up from the fifth position, 94% of applications were tested for some form of broken access control with the average incidence rate of 3.81%, and has the most occurrences in the contributed dataset with over 318k. Notable Common Weakness Enumerations (CWEs) included are CWE-200: Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized ActorCWE-201: Exposure of Sensitive Information Through Sent Data, and CWE-352: Cross-Site Request Forgery.

  2. [Wayback/Archive] A02 Cryptographic Failures – OWASP Top 10:2021
    Shifting up one position to #2, previously known as Sensitive Data Exposure, which is more of a broad symptom rather than a root cause, the focus is on failures related to cryptography (or lack thereof). Which often lead to exposure of sensitive data. Notable Common Weakness Enumerations (CWEs) included are CWE-259: Use of Hard-coded PasswordCWE-327: Broken or Risky Crypto Algorithm, and CWE-331 Insufficient Entropy .
  3. [Wayback/Archive] A03 Injection – OWASP Top 10:2021

    Injection slides down to the third position. 94% of the applications were tested for some form of injection with a max incidence rate of 19%, an average incidence rate of 3%, and 274k occurances. Notable Common Weakness Enumerations (CWEs) included are CWE-79: Cross-site ScriptingCWE-89: SQL Injection, and CWE-73: External Control of File Name or Path.

Via; [Archive] Kristian Köhntopp on Twitter: “Vieles aus diesem Thread ist nun geordneter in … zu finden.… “

Very much related as A01 was the basic cause of GitHub’s commitment to npm ecosystem security | The GitHub Blog – no npm package can historically ben tracked to be authentic.

We determined that this vulnerability was due to inconsistent authorization checks and validation of data across several microservices that handle requests to the npm registry. In this architecture, the authorization service was properly validating user authorization to packages based on data passed in request URL paths. However, the service that performs underlying updates to the registry data determined which package to publish based on the contents of the uploaded package file.


Posted in Development, Power User, Security, Software Development | Leave a Comment »

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