"hey @nickoneill, what's your wifi?" "We don't have wifi." "What? You don't have wifi?!" "No, we don't have wifi" … "Goddamnit, Nick." pic.twitter.com/7LO6DoePsO
Er zijn inderdaad veel manier waarop data gebiased kan zijn, zeker in dit soort contexten. Heel veel van dit soort oplossingen staan of vallen met hoe goed mensen zich er van bewust zijn dat data nooit een ‘gegeven’ is maar gemaakt wordt.https://twitter.com/jpluimers/status/1348550923958804480
Data is nooit een doorgeefluik van de werkelijkheid, we máken data. We kiezen ervoor om iets te tellen bijvoorbeeld, en maken keuzes in wat wel en niet meegenomen wordt. Tot op zekere hoogte is dat arbitrair (goede nieuws: daar kunnen we wel verantwoording over afleggen!).
Met dat in het achterhoofd is een eerste stap om je sterk afvragen wat zegt deze data wel en vooral ook niet. En vervolgens: wat kunnen/mogen/willen we hier dan wel of niet mee? Wat betekenen deze keuzes voor gebruikers of burgers?
Welke normen en waarden zitten er ‘verstopt’ in of achter de data? Op wie heeft de inzet van die data effect en in welke mate?
Misschien vindt je boek ‘Automating Inequality’ van Virginia Eubanks interessant. Ook mijn collega @GerwinSchie doet naar dit soort dingen onderzoek. Zie bijvoorbeeld:
I have had quite a few discussions about data being “deleted” in information systems.
Often, data – despite GDPR – isn’t, or can’t be deleted for many reasons, especially when data is retained on backups, cloud storage is involved or data has been copied in other ways.
Many times, marking with a flag that data is deleted, is enough, but often it isn’t and then you need processes to track down all occurrences of the data and delete it permanently, which can be a tedious job.
Some more interesting thoughts are in this thread that triggered me:
Despite the Electron framework, you might really want to consider writing desktop applications using native tools as it is extremely hard to write performant desktop applications otherwise.
It isn’t by coincidence that last year, Firefox by default makes the backspace key not go back to the previous web-page: it is still a problem in a truckload of interactive web applications, often even in web-based desktop applications:
Also web-developers tend to love to introduce their own custom UX, like for a 6-digit numeric field, use 6 separate digit fields making it extremely hard to copy/paste numbers.
An important [Wayback/Archive] A01:2021 – Broken Access Control, in German, is a pre-amble for a future post about getting a feel how to counter the vulnerabilities that OWASP tracks and documents.
Basically remember that Broken Access Control is by far the most vulnerable feature in applications:
Broken Access Control war 2017 auf Platz 5 und ist jetzt Problem #1. 94 % der getesteten Anwendungen hatten irgendeine Form von defekter Zugangskontrolle. Der ehemalige #1 Dauerbrenner Injection ist nur noch auf Platz 3.
Basically the top 3 changed dramatically between 2017 and 2021. The new top-3 is below. Please get acquainted with it.
Moving up from the fifth position, 94% of applications were tested for some form of broken access control with the average incidence rate of 3.81%, and has the most occurrences in the contributed dataset with over 318k. Notable Common Weakness Enumerations (CWEs) included are CWE-200: Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor, CWE-201: Exposure of Sensitive Information Through Sent Data, and CWE-352: Cross-Site Request Forgery.
Shifting up one position to #2, previously known as Sensitive Data Exposure, which is more of a broad symptom rather than a root cause, the focus is on failures related to cryptography (or lack thereof). Which often lead to exposure of sensitive data. Notable Common Weakness Enumerations (CWEs) included are CWE-259: Use of Hard-coded Password, CWE-327: Broken or Risky Crypto Algorithm, and CWE-331 Insufficient Entropy .
Injection slides down to the third position. 94% of the applications were tested for some form of injection with a max incidence rate of 19%, an average incidence rate of 3%, and 274k occurances. Notable Common Weakness Enumerations (CWEs) included are CWE-79: Cross-site Scripting, CWE-89: SQL Injection, and CWE-73: External Control of File Name or Path.
We determined that this vulnerability was due to inconsistent authorization checks and validation of data across several microservices that handle requests to the npm registry. In this architecture, the authorization service was properly validating user authorization to packages based on data passed in request URL paths. However, the service that performs underlying updates to the registry data determined which package to publish based on the contents of the uploaded package file.
This file contains hidden or bidirectional Unicode text that may be interpreted or compiled differently than what appears below. To review, open the file in an editor that reveals hidden Unicode characters. Learn more about bidirectional Unicode characters
Ralf Hildebrandt is an active and well-known figure in the Postfix community. He’s a systems engineer for T-NetPro, a German telecommunications company and has spoken about Postfix at industry conferences and contributes regularly to a number of open source mailing lists.
Best practices for Postfix–the popular alternative to Sendmail. Developed with security and speed in mind, Postfix has become a popular alternative to Sendmail and comes preinstalled in many Linux distributions as the default mailer. The Book of Postfix is a complete guide to Postfix whether used at home, as a mailrelay or virus-scanning gateway, or as a company mailserver. Practical examples show how to deal with daily challenges like protecting mail users from spam and viruses, managing multiple domains, and offering roaming access.