Posted by jpluimers on 2018/03/07
In cast I ever want to do Android work again in Visual Studio [WayBack] Visual studio (2015) emulator for android not working – XDE.exe – Exit Code 3 – Stack Overflow
Getting the Android Emulator to run is tough because Hyper-V and networking is awful and running this all in a Windows VM makes it even more complicated.
–jeroen
Posted in .NET, Android, Development, Mobile Development, Software Development, Visual Studio 2015, Visual Studio and tools, Xamarin Studio | Leave a Comment »
Posted by jpluimers on 2018/02/27
How cool are these related libraries:
[WayBack] Miguel de Icaza on Twitter: “On my copious spare time, I wrote a console UI toolkit for .NET, check it out: https://t.co/1fMKvcWUyd… “
–jeroen
Posted in .NET, C#, Development, Software Development | Leave a Comment »
Posted by jpluimers on 2018/02/01
One day I must re-publish these papers:
ID: 1454 First name: Jeroen W. Last name: Pluimers User name: Biography: Jeroen Pluimers has had a long history in software development ranging from high-level knowledge-based systems to low-level communcation. After discovering his love for teaching, he started one of the first Delphi consulting firms in Europe, and has been speaking at national and international conferences ever since. He presents on Delphi, C#, the Microsoft .NET Platform, and Linux. Jeroen is a Certified Delphi Developer and Borland Certified Instructor. Jeroen’s strength is in getting totally different technologies to work together. He likes to integrate different languages, platforms, frameworks, and databases. As a bug hunter and idea generator, Jeroen has contributed to many products such as Developer Express? Component Development Kit and Borland Delphi. In his free time, Jeroen plays percussion in a world-famous marching band. He also enjoys reading fine books and sampling foreign cuisines. Image not available
[WayBack] GetPublished – Author Information
From the referencing pages:
Intermediate paper for Delphi programmers starting to use Linux. It explains how to use and integrate Linux and Kylix with Windows and Delphi.�
As a Delphi developer, you will find C# easier to learn than you might have thought. Get a head start with this revealing presentation.�
This session describes COM, CORBA and SOAP, indicating what they share, what sets them apart, and how you can choose among them.�
This session provides a demonstration of ReCruit, including a discussion of its development and deployment process. ReCruit was built using Delphi and InterBase.�
–jeroen
Posted in BorCon, C#, Conferences, Delphi, Development, Event, SOAP/WebServices, Software Development | Leave a Comment »
Posted by jpluimers on 2018/01/25
tik4net – Connect from .NET C# application to mikrotik router via ADO.NET like API or enjoy O/R mapper like highlevel api.
Source: CRUD examples for all APIs · danikf/tik4net Wiki
[Archive.is] C# API – tik4net on GitHub – Page 2 – MikroTik RouterOS
–jeroen
Posted in .NET, C#, Development, MikroTik, RouterOS, routers, Scripting, Software Development | Leave a Comment »
Posted by jpluimers on 2018/01/23
Via[WayBack] The mother lode of well-known SIDs – The Old New Thing this great source of information [WayBack] [MS-DTYP]: Well-Known SID Structures from which I got the table below.
Later on, I found many more links with this information, for instance:
2.4.2.4 Well-Known SID Structures
Well-known SID structures are a group of SIDs that identify generic users or generic groups. Their values remain constant across all operating systems.
The <root-domain> identifier represents the three sub-authority values associated with the root domain, which is the first domain that is created in an Active Directory forest infrastructure. The <domain> identifier represents the three sub-authority values associated with any domain, and the <machine> identifier represents the three sub-authority values associated with a specific machine. Root domain–based groups like the Enterprise and Schema administrators have forestwide permissions.
For example, given a SID defined in the table below as S-1-5-21-<domain>-513, and the actual instance of the domain having the three sub authority values of 1, 2, and 3:
S-1: Indicates a revision or version 1 SID.
5: SECURITY_NT_AUTHORITY, indicates it’s a Windows specific SID.
21: SECURITY_NT_NON_UNIQUE, indicates a domain id will follow.
1-2-3: The next three SubAuthority arrays contain 32-bit random numbers to uniquely identify the domain.
RID: Indicates a unique object ID within the domain.
The actual constructed SID would be S-1-5-21-1-2-3-513.
The following table lists well-known SID structure values and their matching descriptions.
Constant/value Description NULL S-1-0-0
No Security principal. EVERYONE S-1-1-0
A group that includes all users. LOCAL S-1-2-0
A group that includes all users who have logged on locally. CONSOLE_LOGON S-1-2-1
A group that includes users who are logged on to the physical console. This SID can be used to implement security policies that grant different rights based on whether a user has been granted physical access to the console.<5> CREATOR_OWNER S-1-3-0
A placeholder in an inheritable access control entry (ACE). When the ACE is inherited, the system replaces this SID with the SID for the object’s creator. CREATOR_GROUP S-1-3-1
A placeholder in an inheritable ACE. When the ACE is inherited, the system replaces this SID with the SID for the primary group of the object’s creator. OWNER_SERVER S-1-3-2
A placeholder in an inheritable ACE. When the ACE is inherited, the system replaces this SID with the SID for the object’s owner server.<6> GROUP_SERVER S-1-3-3
A placeholder in an inheritable ACE. When the ACE is inherited, the system replaces this SID with the SID for the object’s group server.<7> OWNER_RIGHTS S-1-3-4
A group that represents the current owner of the object. When an ACE that carries this SID is applied to an object, the system ignores the implicit READ_CONTROL and WRITE_DAC permissions for the object owner. NT_AUTHORITY S-1-5
A SID containing only the SECURITY_NT_AUTHORITY identifier authority. DIALUP S-1-5-1
A group that includes all users who have logged on through a dial-up connection. NETWORK S-1-5-2
A group that includes all users who have logged on through a network connection. BATCH S-1-5-3
A group that includes all users who have logged on through a batch queue facility. INTERACTIVE S-1-5-4
A group that includes all users who have logged on interactively. LOGON_ID S-1-5-5-x-y
A logon session. The X and Y values for these SIDs are different for each logon session and are recycled when the operating system is restarted. SERVICE S-1-5-6
A group that includes all security principals that have logged on as a service. ANONYMOUS S-1-5-7
A group that represents an anonymous logon. PROXY S-1-5-8
Identifies a SECURITY_NT_AUTHORITY Proxy.<8> ENTERPRISE_DOMAIN_CONTROLLERS S-1-5-9
A group that includes all domain controllers in a forest that uses an Active Directory directory service. PRINCIPAL_SELF S-1-5-10
A placeholder in an inheritable ACE on an account object or group object in Active Directory. When the ACE is inherited, the system replaces this SID with the SID for the security principal that holds the account. AUTHENTICATED_USERS S-1-5-11
A group that includes all users whose identities were authenticated when they logged on. RESTRICTED_CODE S-1-5-12
This SID is used to control access by untrusted code. ACL validation against tokens with RC consists of two checks, one against the token’s normal list of SIDs and one against a second list (typically containing RC – the “RESTRICTED_CODE” token – and a subset of the original token SIDs). Access is granted only if a token passes both tests. Any ACL that specifies RC must also specify WD – the “EVERYONE” token. When RC is paired with WD in an ACL, a superset of “EVERYONE”, including untrusted code, is described. TERMINAL_SERVER_USER S-1-5-13
A group that includes all users who have logged on to a Terminal Services server. REMOTE_INTERACTIVE_LOGON S-1-5-14
A group that includes all users who have logged on through a terminal services logon. THIS_ORGANIZATION S-1-5-15
A group that includes all users from the same organization. If this SID is present, the OTHER_ORGANIZATION SID MUST NOT be present.<9> IUSR S-1-5-17
An account that is used by the default Internet Information Services (IIS) user. LOCAL_SYSTEM S-1-5-18
An account that is used by the operating system. LOCAL_SERVICE S-1-5-19
A local service account. NETWORK_SERVICE S-1-5-20
A network service account. ENTERPRISE_READONLY_DOMAIN_CONTROLLERS S-1-5-21-<root domain>-498
A universal group containing all read-only domain controllers in a forest. COMPOUNDED_AUTHENTICATION S-1-5-21-0-0-0-496
Device identity is included in the Kerberos service ticket. If a forest boundary was crossed, then claims transformation occurred.<10> CLAIMS_VALID S-1-5-21-0-0-0-497
Claims were queried for in the account’s domain, and if a forest boundary was crossed, then claims transformation occurred.<11> ADMINISTRATOR S-1-5-21-<machine>-500
A user account for the system administrator. By default, it is the only user account that is given full control over the system. GUEST S-1-5-21-<machine>-501
A user account for people who do not have individual accounts. This user account does not require a password. By default, the Guest account is disabled. DOMAIN_ADMINS S-1-5-21-<domain>-512
A global group whose members are authorized to administer the domain. By default, the DOMAIN_ADMINS group is a member of the Administrators group on all computers that have joined a domain, including the domain controllers. DOMAIN_ADMINS is the default owner of any object that is created by any member of the group. DOMAIN_USERS S-1-5-21-<domain>-513
A global group that includes all user accounts in a domain. DOMAIN_GUESTS S-1-5-21-<domain>-514
A global group that has only one member, which is the built-in Guest account of the domain. DOMAIN_COMPUTERS S-1-5-21-<domain>-515
A global group that includes all clients and servers that have joined the domain. DOMAIN_DOMAIN_CONTROLLERS S-1-5-21-<domain>-516
A global group that includes all domain controllers in the domain. CERT_PUBLISHERS S-1-5-21-<domain>-517
A global group that includes all computers that are running an enterprise certification authority. Cert Publishers are authorized to publish certificates for User objects in Active Directory. SCHEMA_ADMINISTRATORS S-1-5-21-<root-domain>-518
A universal group in a native-mode domain, or a global group in a mixed-mode domain. The group is authorized to make schema changes in Active Directory. ENTERPRISE_ADMINS S-1-5-21-<root-domain>-519
A universal group in a native-mode domain, or a global group in a mixed-mode domain. The group is authorized to make forestwide changes in Active Directory, such as adding child domains. GROUP_POLICY_CREATOR_OWNERS S-1-5-21-<domain>-520
A global group that is authorized to create new Group Policy Objects in Active Directory. READONLY_DOMAIN_CONTROLLERS S-1-5-21-<domain>-521
A global group that includes all read-only domain controllers. CLONEABLE_CONTROLLERS S-1-5-21-<domain>-522
A global group that includes all domain controllers in the domain that can be cloned. PROTECTED_USERS S-1-5-21-<domain>-525
A global group that are afforded additional protections against authentication security threats. <12> For more information, see [MS-APDS] and [MS-KILE]. RAS_SERVERS S-1-5-21-<domain>-553
A domain local group for Remote Access Services (RAS) servers. Servers in this group have Read Account Restrictions and Read Logon Information access to User objects in the Active Directory domain local group. BUILTIN_ADMINISTRATORS S-1-5-32-544
A built-in group. After the initial installation of the operating system, the only member of the group is the Administrator account. When a computer joins a domain, the Domain Administrators group is added to the Administrators group. When a server becomes a domain controller, the Enterprise Administrators group also is added to the Administrators group. BUILTIN_USERS S-1-5-32-545
A built-in group. After the initial installation of the operating system, the only member is the Authenticated Users group. When a computer joins a domain, the Domain Users group is added to the Users group on the computer. BUILTIN_GUESTS S-1-5-32-546
A built-in group. The Guests group allows users to log on with limited privileges to a computer’s built-in Guest account. POWER_USERS S-1-5-32-547
A built-in group. Power users can perform the following actions:
- Create local users and groups.
- Modify and delete accounts that they have created.
- Remove users from the Power Users, Users, and Guests groups.
- Install programs.
- Create, manage, and delete local printers.
- Create and delete file shares.
ACCOUNT_OPERATORS S-1-5-32-548
A built-in group that exists only on domain controllers. Account Operators have permission to create, modify, and delete accounts for users, groups, and computers in all containers and organizational units of Active Directory except the Built-in container and the Domain Controllers OU. Account Operators do not have permission to modify the Administrators and Domain Administrators groups, nor do they have permission to modify the accounts for members of those groups. SERVER_OPERATORS S-1-5-32-549
A built-in group that exists only on domain controllers. Server Operators can perform the following actions:
- Log on to a server interactively.
- Create and delete network shares.
- Start and stop services.
- Back up and restore files.
- Format the hard disk of a computer.
- Shut down the computer.
PRINTER_OPERATORS S-1-5-32-550
A built-in group that exists only on domain controllers. Print Operators can manage printers and document queues. BACKUP_OPERATORS S-1-5-32-551
A built-in group. Backup Operators can back up and restore all files on a computer, regardless of the permissions that protect those files. REPLICATOR S-1-5-32-552
A built-in group that is used by the File Replication Service (FRS) on domain controllers. ALIAS_PREW2KCOMPACC S-1-5-32-554
A backward compatibility group that allows read access on all users and groups in the domain.<13> REMOTE_DESKTOP S-1-5-32-555
An alias. Members of this group are granted the right to log on remotely.<14> NETWORK_CONFIGURATION_OPS S-1-5-32-556
An alias. Members of this group can have some administrative privileges to manage configuration of networking features.<15> INCOMING_FOREST_TRUST_BUILDERS S-1-5-32-557
An alias. Members of this group can create incoming, one-way trusts to this forest.<16> PERFMON_USERS S-1-5-32-558
An alias. Members of this group have remote access to monitor this computer.<17> PERFLOG_USERS S-1-5-32-559
An alias. Members of this group have remote access to schedule the logging of performance counters on this computer.<18> WINDOWS_AUTHORIZATION_ACCESS_GROUP S-1-5-32-560
An alias. Members of this group have access to the computed tokenGroupsGlobalAndUniversal attribute on User objects.<19> TERMINAL_SERVER_LICENSE_SERVERS S-1-5-32-561
An alias. A group for Terminal Server License Servers.<20> DISTRIBUTED_COM_USERS S-1-5-32-562
An alias. A group for COM to provide computer-wide access controls that govern access to all call, activation, or launch requests on the computer.<21> IIS_IUSRS S-1-5-32-568
A built-in group account for IIS users. CRYPTOGRAPHIC_OPERATORS S-1-5-32-569
A built-in group account for cryptographic operators.<22> EVENT_LOG_READERS S-1-5-32-573
A built-in local group. Members of this group can read event logs from the local machine.<23> CERTIFICATE_SERVICE_DCOM_ACCESS S-1-5-32-574
A built-in local group. Members of this group are allowed to connect to Certification Authorities in the enterprise.<24> RDS_REMOTE_ACCESS_SERVERS S-1-5-32-575
A group that allows members use of Remote Application Services resources. RDS_ENDPOINT_SERVERS S-1-5-32-576
A group that enables member servers to run virtual machines and host sessions. RDS_MANAGEMENT_SERVERS S-1-5-32-577
A group that allows members to access WMI resources over management protocols (such as WS-Management via the Windows Remote Management service). HYPER_V_ADMINS S-1-5-32-578
A group that gives members access to all administrative features of Hyper-V. ACCESS_CONTROL_ASSISTANCE_OPS S-1-5-32-579
A local group that allows members to remotely query authorization attributes and permissions for resources on the local computer. REMOTE_MANAGEMENT_USERS S-1-5-32-580
Members of this group can access Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) resources over management protocols (such as WS-Management [DMTF-DSP0226]). This applies only to WMI namespaces that grant access to the user. WRITE_RESTRICTED_CODE S-1-5-33
A SID that allows objects to have an ACL that lets any service process with a write-restricted token to write to the object. NTLM_AUTHENTICATION S-1-5-64-10
A SID that is used when the NTLM authentication package authenticated the client. SCHANNEL_AUTHENTICATION S-1-5-64-14
A SID that is used when the SChannel authentication package authenticated the client. DIGEST_AUTHENTICATION S-1-5-64-21
A SID that is used when the Digest authentication package authenticated the client. THIS_ORGANIZATION_CERTIFICATE S-1-5-65-1
A SID that indicates that the client’s Kerberos service ticket’s PAC contained a NTLM_SUPPLEMENTAL_CREDENTIAL structure (as specified in [MS-PAC]section 2.6.4). If the OTHER_ORGANIZATION SID is present, then this SID MUST NOT be present. <25> NT_SERVICE S-1-5-80
An NT Service account prefix. USER_MODE_DRIVERS S-1-5-84-0-0-0-0-0
Identifies a user-mode driver process. LOCAL_ACCOUNT S-1-5-113
A group that includes all users who are local accounts.<26> LOCAL_ACCOUNT_AND_MEMBER_OF_ADMINISTRATORS_GROUP S-1-5-114
A group that includes all users who are local accounts and members of the administrators group.<27> OTHER_ORGANIZATION S-1-5-1000
A group that includes all users and computers from another organization. If this SID is present, THIS_ORGANIZATION SID MUST NOT be present.<28> ALL_APP_PACKAGES S-1-15-2-1
All applications running in an app package context. ML_UNTRUSTED S-1-16-0
An untrusted integrity level. ML_LOW S-1-16-4096
A low integrity level. ML_MEDIUM S-1-16-8192
A medium integrity level. ML_MEDIUM_PLUS S-1-16-8448
A medium-plus integrity level. ML_HIGH S-1-16-12288
A high integrity level. ML_SYSTEM S-1-16-16384
A system integrity level. ML_PROTECTED_PROCESS S-1-16-20480
A protected-process integrity level. AUTHENTICATION_AUTHORITY_ASSERTED_IDENTITY S-1-18-1
A SID that means the client’s identity is asserted by an authentication authority based on proof of possession of client credentials.<29> <30> SERVICE_ASSERTED_IDENTITY S-1-18-2
A SID that means the client’s identity is asserted by a service.<31> <32> FRESH_PUBLIC_KEY_IDENTITY S-1-18-3
A SID that means the client’s identity is asserted by an authentication authority based on proof of current possession of client public key credentials.<33> KEY_TRUST_IDENTITY S-1-18-4
A SID that means the client’s identity is based on proof of possession of public key credentials using the key trust object.<34> KEY_PROPERTY_MFA S-1-18-5
A SID that means the key trust object had the multifactor authentication (MFA) property.<35> KEY_PROPERTY_ATTESTATION S-1-18-6
A SID that means the key trust object had the attestation property.<36>
–jeroen
Posted in .NET, Delphi, Development, Software Development, The Old New Thing, Windows Development | Leave a Comment »
Posted by jpluimers on 2018/01/10
Some links via xs:choice element to C# – Google Search.
I need them one day to better understand xsd:choice mapping to C# for both XSD and WSDL usage.
I have the feeling that the WSDL and XSD importer are trying to be smart, so for instance when you have multiple choices that come down to a common basic type like a derivation from xsd:string, it makes to two properties: a C# enumeration to select the type and a C# string value for the content referencing the enumeration through a XmlChoiceIdentifierAttribute.
XmlChoiceIdentifierAttribute.<xsd:choice> Element–jeroen
Posted in .NET, C#, Development, Software Development | Leave a Comment »
Posted by jpluimers on 2017/12/28
Interesting new .NET feature already available for .NET 4.5, but much faster in future .NET versions: [WayBack] C# – All About Span: Exploring a New .NET Mainstay
Documentation (only quoted first paragraph):
Span<T>is a new type we are adding to the platform to represent contiguous regions of arbitrary memory, with performance characteristics on par withT[]. Its APIs are similar to the array, but unlike arrays, it can point to either managed or native memory, or to memory allocated on the stack.
Further on in that document are the Design specifications.
Via:
–jeroen
Posted in .NET, C#, Development, Software Development | Leave a Comment »
Posted by jpluimers on 2017/12/27
From my SO Question Archive:
Just curious: Why is the syntax for try catch in C# (Java also?) hard coded for multiple statements? Why doesn’t the language allow:
int i; string s = DateTime.Now.Seconds % 2 == 1 ? "1" : "not 1"; try i = int.Parse(s); catch i = 0;The example is for trivial purposes only. I know there’s
int.TryParse.
[WayBack] c# – Why does Try-Catch require curly braces – Stack Overflow.
I asked this question partially because of my Delphi background where there are two try statements (one for finally and one for except a.k.a. catch) neither having the braces problem as try/finally/except all are block boundaries.
The most interesting bit was the [WayBack] answer by [WayBack] Eric Lippert (ex C# compiler team, now at Facebook after an intermediate position at Coverty) referring to his [WayBack] Why are braces required in try-catch-finally? | Fabulous adventures in coding blog entry.
The answer and blog entry come down to preventing ambiguity.
His answer reveals that a compound try/catch/finally statement is converted by two try statements like this:
try
{
try
{
XYZ();
}
catch(whatever)
{
DEF();
}
}
finally
{
ABC();
}
This emphasises that catch and finally are conceptually indeed two different things which statistics show.
I need to dig up the numbers (I remember researching this for Java and Delphi code a very long time ago – think Delphi 7 era – and C# code a long time ago – think C# 2 era), but this comment should still hold:
My observation in most code I’ve seen is that the combination of
catchandfinallyis hardly (i.e. far less than 1%) used in the same statement (or in other languages in nested statements), because they serve two very different purposes. That’s why I prefer not to mix them, and if I do, use the nested construction to both emphasize the difference in purpose, and execution order. Learning new things every day: How often is youroccasionallypercentage wise? – Jeroen Wiert Pluimers Dec 23 ’12 at 19:34
–jeroen
Posted in C#, Delphi, Development, Software Development | Leave a Comment »
Posted by jpluimers on 2017/12/26
Ever introduced an extra parameter on a method, tracked all its usages and made the compiler happy by providing a corresponding extra argument in all the calls of that method? Sure you have…
Things like that need a reminder: the joy of reflection and lambdas…
Very good train of thought (and solving!) at [WayBack] Head scratching with a TargetParameterCountException | Software on a String
By [WayBack] Marjan Venema – Google+
–jeroen
Posted in .NET, C#, Development, Software Development | Leave a Comment »
Posted by jpluimers on 2017/12/18
This will bite me some time for sure, so for my link archive: [WayBack] TRestClient and Cipher restrictions to TLSv1.2 does not work on Windows7 and Server2008R2 … and how it can be solved… – Günther Schoch – Google+
References:
For at least some Windows 7 and Server 2008 R2 systems, that update (KB3140245) doesn’t automatically turns up in the Windows Update list.
To make matters worse, the page cannot be archived in either the WayBack machine or Archive.is (I tried multiple times with empty results).
Luckily, there is a copy at [WayBack] KB3140245 DefaultSecureProtocols – Security.NL.
After installing the update, you have to ensure you set the DefaultSecureProtocols registry value to the bitmap value that indicates with SSL/TLS versions you want to support:
The DefaultSecureProtocols registry entry can be added in the following path:
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\WinHttpOn x64-based computers, DefaultSecureProtocols must also be added to the Wow6432Node path:
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\WinHttpThe registry value is a DWORD bitmap. The value to use is determined by adding the values corresponding to the protocols desired.
DefaultSecureProtocols Value Protocol enabled 0x00000008 Enable SSL 2.0 by default 0x00000020 Enable SSL 3.0 by default 0x00000080 Enable TLS 1.0 by default 0x00000200 Enable TLS 1.1 by default 0x00000800 Enable TLS 1.2 by default For example:
The administrator wants to override the default values for WINHTTP_OPTION_SECURE_PROTOCOLS to specify TLS 1.1 and TLS 1.2.
Take the value for TLS 1.1 (0x00000200) and the value for TLS 1.2 (0x00000800) then add them together in calculator (in programmer mode), the resulting registry value would be 0x00000A00.
–jeroen
Posted in .NET, Delphi, Development, Power User, Software Development, Windows, Windows 7, Windows Server 2008 R2 | 2 Comments »
The Wiert Corner - irregular stream of stuff 