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Jeroen W. Pluimers on .NET, C#, Delphi, databases, and personal interests

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Archive for the ‘Certificates’ Category

The Real Risks of eMudhra | IFIN

Posted by jpluimers on 2026/11/19

An important article to read in the aftermath of the eMudhra certificate disaster is [Wayback/Archive] The Real Risks of eMudhra | IFIN.

Starting from the browsers – most of these should not be affected any more – it continues with the non-browsers, especially the kind of equipment that will never be updated, explaining how they can be part of an attack (and a blessing – hello pesky TV manufacturers showing ads on the equipment we bought), the terminals you type commands in, software development stacks implementing their own certificate stores and many many other entry points. Then mitigations are covered, basically the good old CMDB is new and shiny again, and the most important bit: have a plan for next time. As there will be a next time. 

The blog post goes hand in hand with observations like for instance [Wayback/Archive] Jan Schaumann: “I just ran a check across / on my mac and found 43 #emudhra vulnerable vendored bundles. …” – Mastodon 🐘

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Posted in Certificates, Encryption, HTTPS/TLS security, Infosec (Information Security), PKI, Power User, Public Key Cryptography, Security | Leave a Comment »

Volledig Post-Quantum Cryptografie website

Posted by jpluimers on 2026/11/04

Voor mijn link archief als ik er aan toe kom om ook een PQC web-site in te richten: [Wayback/Archive] Volledig Post-Quantum Cryptografie website, een mooi artikel van [Wayback/Archive] Harld (@harld@masto.ai) – Mastodon die sommigen kennen van een of meer van deze sites:

Via

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Posted in *nix, *nix-tools, Apache2, Certificates, Development, Encryption, HTTPS/TLS security, PKI, Power User, PQC, Public Key Cryptography, Security, Software Development, Web Development | Leave a Comment »

eMudhra popularised the number four in old jokes and caused many other jokes as well

Posted by jpluimers on 2026/10/29

A week ago, it seems like an eternity in vulnerability land, eMudhra popularised quoting the number four:

It felt like the Diginotar debacle, but 15 years later and voluntarily. And like I wrote yesterday, another (partially – hello “O=eMudhra BV, C=NL” next to “O=eMudhra Inc, C=US”) Dutch company involved. Hopefully that’s not a prediction for the future.

Given their laughably weak keys and their laughably excuse, lots of jokes appeared.

Apart from “there is always an XKCD” (I wish [Wayback/Archive] Relevant XKCD Search still functioned, but luckily [Wayback/Archive] Relevant XKCD does, hello [Wayback/Archive] Relevant XKCD=random), Randall Munroe also created a  new one, plus one of the XCKD memes was re-used, so here are three, plus a whole lot of other jokes that quickly appeared:

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Posted in Certificates, eMudhra disaster, Encryption, HTTPS/TLS security, PKI, Power User, Public Key Cryptography, Security | Leave a Comment »

“Add `–emudhra` option (#8500)” and “Add –emudhra-old option (#8503)” · mitmproxy/mitmproxy@1692344 and mitmproxy/mitmproxy@62243e7

Posted by jpluimers on 2026/10/28

These didn’t take long for [Wayback/Archive] Mitmproxy 12.3: eMudhra Edition to appear with these commits:

  1. [Wayback/Archive] Add `–emudhra` option by mhils · Pull Request #8500 · mitmproxy/mitmproxy
  2. [Wayback/Archive] Add `–emudhra-old` option by mhils · Pull Request #8503 · mitmproxy/mitmproxy · GitHub

It is by [Wayback/Archive] GitHub – mitmproxy/mitmproxy: An interactive TLS-capable intercepting HTTP proxy for penetration testers and software developers. · GitHub which I mentioned a few times before on my blog¹, so now is the time introduce the mitmproxy category.

Oh BTW: like Diginotar, eMudhra lists about half of the affected certificates as coming from the Netherlands. See the O=eMudhra BV, C=NL bits at the [Wayback/Archive] eMudhra Intermediate CA Compromise.

I won’t go into much detail as why it is so easy to generate these eMudhra certificates, as a much better job already has been done at [Wayback/Archive] Why Were eMudhra’s CA Keys Easy to Guess? · Metaheuristic

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Posted in Certificates, Development, eMudhra disaster, Encryption, HTTPS/TLS security, JavaScript/ECMAScript, mitmproxy, PKI, Power User, Public Key Cryptography, Python, Scripting, Security, Software Development, TypeScript | Leave a Comment »